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822 PAC. TEL. & TEL. CO. V. PUBLIC UTILITIE:-< COM. 13-l C.2rl 
[S F. Nos. 17952, 17953. In Bank. Feb. 28, 1950.1 
THE PACU'IC TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COM-
PANY (a Corporation), Petitioner, v. PUBLIC UTILi-
TIES COMMISSION OF THE S'f ATE OF CALI-
FORNIA et al., Respondents. 
[1] Public Utilities - Rate Regulation - Basis of Rate rixing.-
Commissions have power to prevent a utility from passing on 
to the ratepayers unr':!asonabie c~sts for materials and ser-
vices, dnd to the extent tho t utilities secure materials and 
services necessary to their business through contracts made 
by arms-lenbth bargaining in the open market, the contract 
price is crdinarily accepted. as the proper cost to the utility of 
tht materials and 'ervices. 
[2] Id.-Public Utilities Act-Purpose.-The primary pur:--ose of 
the Public Utilities Act (8tats. 1915, p. 115, as amended; 
2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6386) is to insure the public ade-
quate service at reasonable rates without discrimination. 
[3] Id. - Regulation - Contracts.-Public Utilities Act, § 48, em-
powering the Public Utilities Commission to prescribe uniform 
systems of account, relates t how transactions by utilities are 
to be recorded and does not include by implication the power 
to prescribe the terms and conditions of anv transac~ion that 
will be reflected in ·the accounts. 
[4] Id. - Regulation - Contracts.-Public Utilities Ac~. . 52, re-
quiring commission approval of securities issues, limits the 
commission's control to the use to be made of funds raised by 
securities issues, and does not by implication confer jurisdic-
tion on the commission :.0 prescribe the terms on which a 
utility may enter into contracts necessary for the conduct of 
its business. 
[5] Id. - Regulat!on - Contracts.-The determination of vhat is 
reasonable in conducting the business of a utility is the primary 
responsibility of management, and the commission does not 
have the power ~o prescribe terms of contracts and the prac-
tices of utilities and thus substitute its judgment as to what 
is reasonable for that of t:te management. 
[I)j Id.-Regulation-Conduct of Busineus.-In the absence of an 
enabling statute meeting the requirements of due process, the 
Public Utilities Commission cannot require the management of 
[1) See 22 Cal.Jur. 68; 43 Am.Jur. 624. 
?ticK. Dig. References: [1) Public Utilities, § 33; [2) . 'ublic 
Utilities, § 1; [3-6, 8-11) Public Utilities, § 26; [7] Public Utili-
ties, § 32. 
) 
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a utility to make such choices as whether it would be wise 
business judgment to divert profits from the payment of Civ-i· 
dends into fields that the utility has not theretofore entered 
[7] Id.-Rate Regulation-Fixing Rates.-In the absen('t' of a 
statute granting the Public Utilities Commission power to fix 
minimum rates to prevent· injurious competition, there is a 
"zone of reasonableness" within which a utility can 'b itF own 
rates, and it is for the man~ement to decide what rates ,vithin 
that zonE' are likely to prove most beneficial to the utility. 
[8] ld.-Regulation-Relations Jletween Labor and Ma.::lal'nment. 
-In the absence of statutory authorization. the Public Utili-
ties Commission does not have .,ower to formUlate the labor 
policies of utilities, ;;0 h wages or to arbitrate labor disputes. 
[9] Id.-Regulation-Oontracts-Between A1Iillated Oorporations. 
-In the absence of e%press statutory authority, the P-lb1ic 
Utility Commission's control over contracts between affiliated 
corporations is limited to disallowance of excessive payments 
for the purpose of bing rates. 
[10J Id.-Regulation-Contracts-Between AJliliated Oorpe :ationa. 
-The policy of the Public Utilities Commission not 0 pre-
scribe the terms of contracts betweer: affiliated corporations is 
consistent with tile provisions of the Public Utilities Act, there 
being nothing that contracts of public utilities affecting -ates 
and services are subject to greater regulation when they are 
between affiliated corporations than when they are not. 
[11] Id.-Regulation-lJontracts-Between Amliated Oorpora-tions. 
The Public utilities Commission may not disregard thesepa-
rate corporate entities of affiliated corporations for the pur-
pose of e%tending its jurir. iiction so as to prescribe the terms 
on which one corporatio!' may contract with the other for 
eertain sp.rvices, where e%cessive payments are not e%acted by 
one corporation 80 as to impair the capital of the other and 
thus weaken the 1&tte1"8 ability to serve the public. 
PROCEEDINGS to review orders of the Public Utilities 
Commission prescribing terms on which one telephone and 
telegraph company may contract with another telephone and 
telegraph company for certain services. Orders annulled. 
Arthur T. George, Eugene M. Prince, Eugene D. Bennett 
and Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro for Petitioner. 
Everett C. McKeage, Roderick B. Cas!';idy. Boris H. Lakusta, 
Hal F. Wiggins, J. Thomason Phelps and Harold J. McCarthy 
fol' Respondents. 
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Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney (Los Angeles), Roger 
bergh, Assistant City Attorney, Dion R. Holm, City 
(San Franr.isco), John W. Collier, City Attorney (v",J\.uunlU~ 
Archer Bowden, Assistant City Attorney, and Emuel J. 
man for Real Parties in Interest. 
TRA YNOR, J .-In two petitions for writs of review 
Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company attacks two 
tually identical orders of the Public Utilities 
prescribing the terms on which Pacific may contract with 
American Telephone and Telegraph Company for certain 
ices. Although the two orders grew out of separate rate 
ceedings, they involve identical issues and may be treated as 
American owns 87.93 per cent of the capital stock of 
The commission found that American dominates Pacific and 
that the contract between the two, whereby Pacific paid one, 
per cent of its gross receipts for the services of American, was 
not in fact a contract but an arbitrary exaction from Pacific 
by its controlling parent company. It therefore entered its . 
orders specifying the terms upon which Pacific could continue 
its service contract with American. They provide: "It Is 
Hereby Further Ordered that, as applied to its California 
intrastate operations, applicant, the Pacific Telephone and "j~.'" 
Telegraph Company, hereafter, shall pay to the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, for services rendered by 
it or any of its affiliates to applicant, no more than the reason.'j 
able cost incurred in the rendition of such services or the:! 
reasonable value of said services, whichever is the lesser. That '1 
in determining the reasonable value of any services rendered, ~ 
consideration shall be given, among other things, to what it .~ 
would reasonably cost applicant to perform such service with ~ 
its own organization. Services rendered to applicant, which,l 
in the judgment of the Commission, are not reasonably reo ~. 
quired by applicant shall not be paid for by applicant. Neither 
applicant nor any officer, agent or servant of applicant. by 
any device whatsoever or under any pretense or guise, directly 
or indirectly, shall commit any act or engage in any conduct 
which shall be calculated to circumvent or evade the intent 
of this order. 
"It Is Hereby Further Ordered that applicant shall file 
with this Commission. bimonthly, a verified report showing 
for the immediately preceding two-calendar-month period all 
payments made by applicant to the American Telephone anei 
Telegraph Company for services rendered to applicant by said 
) 
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American Telephone and Telegraph Company and/or any of 
its affiliates, to~ether with an itemization of said services and 
the amount paid by applicant for each type of sen'ice ren-. 
«ered, such report to be filed not later than forty (40) days 
after the close of the period which it covers. Said vel'ifit'd 
report shall show, for each type of service rendered, the total 
cost incurred by the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany or its affiliates in the rendition of said service to appli-
cant. and the payment therefor by applicant on an allocated 
basil;, segregated 88 to company-wide. total California and 
California intrastate operations. The first report shall be for 
the months of January and February, 1949 and shall be filed 
on or before April 9, 1949. 
"It is Hereby Further Ordered that, as applied to its Cali-
fornia intrastate operations, the amount of $2,250,000. on an 
annual basis, shall be adopted by applicant as the base and 
starting point for the program and procedurc prescribed by 
this order and applicant shall be entitled to pay, on an annual 
basis, to American Telephone and Telegraph Company said 
amount for services rendered to applicant by American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company and/or its affiliates pursuant 
to the license contract; provided, however, that said amount 
shall be adjusted to a lesser or f!Teater amount as t.he facts 
and circumstances may warrant, but, in no event. shall appli-
cant pay more than $2,250,000 on an annual basis without 
first seeking and receiving the authority of this Commission 
so to do." 
When these orders were entered the difference between 
the amount Pacific was to pay on the basis of one per cent of 
gross revenue as provided in the license contract and the 
amount allowed by the commission on an allocated cost basis 
was approximately $250,000. The commission was willing 
to allow payment of $2,250.000; one per cent of gross revenue 
was approximately $2,500,000. In these proceedings Pacific 
is not challengin!? the power of the Public Utilities Commis-
sion to disallow, for rate fixin!? purposes, payments to Amer-
ican that it finds excessive.· Pacific contends, however, that 
·Pacific does Dot concede that disallowance of any part of the pay-
ments was proper; it docs not attack the disnllownnee, however, believ-
ing that the court would not consider it in reviewing a rate-firing order 
unless the rate finally fixed was confiscatory. (See, Mal'ket Street Ry. 
Co. v. Railroad C017l., 24 Cal.2d 378,40:; [1:i0 P.2d 196]; American Toll 
Bridge Co. v. Railroad Commis .• ;on, 12 Cal.2fl 1~4. 1!lRl!l4 [83 P.2d 1]; 
Sal. Joaquin Light 4' -"ower Corp. v. Railroad (;o/lwluliion, 175 Cal. 7" 
76-77 [165 P. 16].) 
) 
826 PAC. TEL. & TEL. Co. tI. PUBLIC UTILITIES COM. [34 C.2d 
the commission has no jurisdiction to prescribe the terms on . 
which it may contract with American. 
[1] It is settled that commissions have power to prevent 
a utility from passing on to the ratepayers unreasonable costs 
for materials and services. (United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad 
Com .• 278 U.S. 300, 320 [49 S.Ct. 150,73 L.Ed. 3901; Chicago 
etc Railway Co. v. Wellman. 143 U.S. 339, 345-346 [12 S.Ct. 
400, 36 L.Ed. 176].) To the extent that utilities secure 
materials and services necessary to their business through 
contracts made by arms-length bargaining in the open market, 
the contract price is ordinarily accepted as the proper cost 
to the utility of the materials and services. Since the advent 
of the bolding company, however, that both controls and 
provides services for a network of operating utilities, new 
problems in regulation have arisen. When services are ren-
dered to an operating utility by an affiliated company that 
owns a controlling fraction of the stock of the operating com-
pany, the safeguards provided by arms-length bargaining are 
absent, and commissions have been vigilant to protect the 
rate-payers from excessive rates reflecting excessive payments 
by operating companies to their parents. (See, Western Dis-
tno'g. Co. v. Public Servo Com., 285 U.S. 119, 126-127 [52 
8.Ct. 283; 76 L.Ed. 655] ; Dayton Power « Light Co. v. Public 
Util. Com., 292 U.S. 290, 295 [54 S.Ct. 647, 78 L.Ed. 1267].) 
Many state legislatures, not satisfied that the indirect control 
of payments between affiliated utility corporations through 
rate regulation was adequate to protect the consumer and 
investor from the possible abuses that could arise out of con-
tracts between tbe affiliated corporations. enacted statutes 
specifical1y granting to their commissions power to regulate 
payments under such contracts. (See, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 957, 
982-989.) Similar powers over gas and electric utilities have 
been given to the Securities and Exchange Commission by the 
federal Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 [49 
Stats. 838, 15 U.S.C.A. § 79 et seq.]. (See, 49 Harv.L.Rev. 957. 
989-999.) California. however, has not expressly granted such 
power to the commission, and it is therefore necessary to de-
termine whetber tbe power may be fairly implied from the 
powers that have been granted. 
[2] The primary purpose of tbe Public Utilities Act 
[Stats. 1915, p. 115, as amended. 2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
6386] is to insure the public adequate service at reasonable 
rates without discrimination. (Pacific Tel. etc. CO. V. Eshl,e-
man, 166 Cal. 640, 663 [137 P. 1119, Ann.Cas. 1915C 822, 
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50 L.R.A. N.S. 652) ; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Com., 
173 Cal. 577, 582 [160 P. 828, 2 A.L.R. 975] ; Southern Pac. 
Co. v. Railroad Com., 13 Cal. 2d 89, 118 [87 P.2d 1055].) The 
act grants to the commission broad regulatory powers, which 
may conveniently be divided into two classes. The commis-
SiOll has been given broad powers to regulate the relationship 
of the utility to the consumer; thus it can determine the 
services that must be provided by the utility and the rates 
therefor. It has also been given certain specific powers to 
regulate the manner in which the utility provides the required 
sen-ices to safeguard the utility's ability to serve the public 
efficiently at reasonable rates; thus the commission must 
approve the sale or encumbrance of operative property neces-
sary or useful to the utility in the performance of its duties 
(§ 51), and it must approve the issue of securities and may 
specify the manner in which funds so raised may be spent. 
(§ 52.) The act does not, however, specifically grant to the 
commission power to regulate the contracts by which the 
utility secures the labor, materials, and services necessary for 
the conduct of its business, whether such contracts are made 
with affiliated corporations or others. 
[3] The commission contends that jurisdiction may be 
implied from the provisions of section 48 of the act empowering 
the commission to prescribe uniform systems of accounts. 
This power, however, relates, not to what transactions are to 
be made, but to how they are to be recorded. It enables the 
commission to keep informed of the financial management of 
the utility and increases the effectiveness of its other powers. 
It cannot reasonably be held, however, to include by implica-
tion the power to prescribe the terms and conditions of any 
transaction that will be reflected in the accounts. 
[4] The commission contends that jurisdiction may be 
implied from the provisions of section 52 of the act requiring 
commission approval of securities issues. It bases this conten-
tion on the premise that, by approval of the securities that 
Pacific issues, it provides Pacific with a defense to any action 
a shareholder might bring to prevent abuse of his interest by 
the management, and that therefore it must have the power 
to protect minority shareholders from abuses arising out of 
contracts made with the majority shareholder, American. 
There is nothing in section 52, however, to indicate that com-
mission approval of securities issues operates to deprive mi-
nority shareholders of remedies they would otherwise have. 
Section 52 provides the extent to which the commission may 
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control expenditures under its terms, and this control is: 
limited to the use to be made of funds raised by securities' 
issues. Pacific, however, is not making these payments from 
funds so raised. . 
Section 32 of the act provides that ., Whenever the com-
mission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon 
complaint, shall find that the rates . . . charged or collected 
by any public utility ... or that the rules, regulations, prac-
tices or contracts, or any of them, affecting such rates . . • ' 
are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, or i 
in anywise in violation of any provision of law . . . the com. i 
mission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates i 
. . . practices or contracts to be thereafter observed and in 
force, and shall fix the same by order as hereinafter provided. 
. . ." Section 35 of the act provides for similar powers over 
practices of a utility relating to the services it renders. Section 
31 of the act provides that" The railroad commission is hereby 
vested with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in the state and to do all things, whether 
herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are 
necessary and convenient in the exercise of such power and 
jurisdiction. " It is contended that the grants of regulatory 
power under these sections give the commission jurisdiction 
to determine the terms on which Pacific may contract with 
American and that the license contract has so much effect 
on the rates and services of Pacific that it may be regulated 
directly by the commission. 
[5] Almost every contract a utility makes is bound to 
affect its rates and services. Moreover, the question whether 
a contract or practice is reasonable is one on which, except 
in clear cases, there is bound to be conflicting evidence and 
considerable leeway for conflicting opinions. The determina-
tion of what is reasonable in conducting the business of the 
utility is the primary responsibility of management. If the 
commission is empowered to prescribe the terms of contracts 
and the practices of utilities and thus substitute its judgment 
as to what is reasonable for that of the management, it is 
empowered to undertake the management of all utilities sub-
ject to its jurisdiction. It has been repeatedly held, however, 
that the commission does not have such power. "And, finally, 
it may not be amiss to point out that the devotion to a public 
use by a person or corporation of property held by them in 
ownership does not destroy thplr ownership and does not vest 
title to the property in tbe pllblic so as to justify, under the 
) 
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exercise of police power, the taking away of the management 
and control of the property from its owners without com-
pensation, upon the ground that public convenience would 
better be served thereby, or that the owners themselves have 
proven false or derelict in the performance of their public 
duty. Any law or order seeking to do this passes beyond 
the ultimate limits of the police power, however vague and 
undefined those limits may be." (Pacific Tel. etc. Co. v. Eshle· 
man, 166 Cal. 640, 665 [137 P. 1119, Ann. Cas. 1915C 822, 50 
L.R.A.N.S. 652] ; Atchison etc. Ry. Co. v. Rat1road Com., 173 
Cal. 577, 583 [160 P. 828, 2 A.L.R. 975] ; Hollywood C. of C. v. 
Railroad Com., 192 Cal. 307, 310 [219 P. 983, 30 A.L.R. 68) ; 
Southern Pac. Co. v. Rat1road Com., 13 Cal.2d 89, 118 [87 
P.2d 1055].) 
[6] It might, for example, be wise business judgment to 
divert profits from the payment of dividends to finance expan-
sion into fields that the utility has not theretofore entered. In 
the absence of an enabling statute meeting the require-
ments of due process, however, the commission cannot require 
management to make such choices. (Hollywood C. of C. v. 
Railroad Com., 192 Cal. 307 [219 P. 983, 30 A.L.R. 68].) 
[7] Similarly, in the absence of a statute granting the com-
mission the power to fix minimum rates to prevent injurious 
competition, both this court and the commission have recog-
nized a "zone of reasonableness" within which a carrier can 
fix its own rates. It is for the management to decide what 
rates within that zone are likely to prove most beneficial to 
the carrier. (Southern Pac. Co. v. Rai1road Com., 13 Cal.2d 
89,118-119 [87 P.2d 1055].) 
[8] Again, there is great public interest in the relations 
between labor and management, for wages invariably affect 
rates, and disputes over them or other matters are bound to 
affect services. Accordingly there has been considerable state 
and federal legislation to diminish economic warfare between 
labor and management. In the absence of statutory authoriza-
tion, however, it would hardly be contended that the commis· 
sion has power to formulate the labor policies of utilities, 
to fix wages or to arbitrate labor disputes. 
In other jurisdictions the courts have generally held in 
interpreting statutes essentially like that of California that 
the commission's control over contracts affecting rates and 
services is limited to regulation of contracts that directly affect 
the service the rate-payer will receive at a particular rate. 
) 
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(Illinois Commerce Commission v. East St. Louis & C. Ry. Co., 
361 Ill. 606 [198 N.E. 716, 719] ; Philadelphia City Passenge,. 
Ry Co. v. Public Service Commtss10n, 271 Pa. 39 [114 A. 642, 
647-648].) Thus, the division of a city into various zones by 
a transit company to fix fares directly aff('cts rates. Contracts 
whereby the rate drops as consumption increases or wbereby 
the liability of a carrier for loss or damage is limited to a 
declared value of the goods shipped in consid~ration of a lower 
rate directly affect rates. Such contracts and practices affect 
the relationship of the utility to the consumer. not its relation. 
ship to those who supply it with materials and services. 
It is contended. bowever. that the license contract between 
Pacific and American is not like ordinary contracts through 
which utilities secure materials and services; that because 
Pacific and American are affiliated corporations and because 
American dominates Pacific, the commission may prescribe 
thE' terms of the contract between them. 
[9] In the absence of express statutory authority it bas • 
generally been held that a commission's control over contracts , 
between affiliated corporations is limited to disallowance of 
excessive payments for the purposc of fixing rates. (Phila-
delphia City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Public Service CommlSStOn, 
271 Pa. 39 [114 A. 642, 647-648] ; State ex rel. City of St. 
Joseph v. PublIc Service Commission, 325 Mo. 209 [30 S.W.2d 
8, 14J ; Lo'l1c Star Gas Co. v.Corporation Commission of Okla-
homa, 170 Okla. 292 [39 P.2d 547, 553-554J ; see, also, Colum-
bus Gas & Fuel Co. v. PublIc Utilities Commission, 292 U.S. 
398,414-415 [54 S.Ct. 763, 78 L.Ed. 1327, 91 A.L.R 1403] ; 
49 Harv.L.Rev. 957, 985; 48 Yale L.J. 1015, 1020.) In the 
past the California commission has recognized similar limita-
tions upon its powers. "All this Commission is able to do is to 
regulate the amount that is to be allowed in operating expensE'S 
as payment to the parent company for services rendered, and 
this amount should be in direct proportion to the value of the 
services received." (1n re Southern California Telephone Co., 
2] C.RC. 274, 282.) In San Diego v. San Diego Consolidated 
Gas & Electric Co., 39 C.RC. 261, where the operating com-
pany was admittedly dominated by its parent, the commission 
disalJowed part of the intercompany payments in fixing new 
rates, but did not order the cessation of such payments. In 
In re Pickwick Stages System, 31 C.R.C. 746, the commis-
. sion under section 52 of thE' act limited the amount an 
operating company could pay its holdiug company out of 
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funds derived from a new securities issue for equipment 
manufactured by the holding company, but did not prevent 
larger payments, requiring only that anything exceeding the 
limits it set be charged to surplus. 
[10] The commission has thus long been conversant with 
the problems presented by affiliated corporations in the field 
. of utility regulation. The instant case is apparently the first 
in which it has attempted to prescribe the terms and condi-
tions of contracts between affiliates. The policy of the com-
mission in the past not to prescribe the terms of contracts be-
tween affiliated corporations is consistent with the provisions 
of the Public Utilities Act. There is nothing in the act to 
suggest that the contracts of public utilities affecting rates and 
services are subject to greater regulation when they are be-
tween affiliated corporations than when they are not. 
[11] Moreover, there is no basis for such broad jurisdiction 
in the principles governing the disregard of a corporate entity. 
In the present case the commission is not disregarding com-
pletely the separate entities of Pacific and American. It does 
not seek to exercise regulatory jurisdiction directly over 
American, under the theory that American is in fact the 
operating utility subject to its jurisdiction. It recognizes that 
American provides Pacific with valuable services for which 
Pacific should pay. It would disregard only the terms of the 
contract by which it is determined how much Pacific should 
pay for the services it receives, and thus substitute its judg-
ment for that of the management as to the reasonable amount 
and the method of its computation. Thus the commission is 
seeking to disregard the separate corporate entities, not to 
exercise more effectively its existing jurisdiction, but to extend 
its jurisdiction. 
By contracting with American, Pacific is not attempt-
ing to evade the jurisdiction of the commission. It is not 
making these payments from funds derived from securities 
issues, or attempting to evade the commission's regulatory 
powers over the expenditures of such funds. (See, In re Pick-
wick Stages System, 31 C.R.C. 746, 753-754.) Nor is it at-
tempting to evade the prohibition of section 1500 of the Cor-
porations Code against the impairment of capital by the pay-
ment of illegal dividends disguised as contract payments. 
Under sections 60 and 75 of the act the commission is empow-
ered to stop illegal practices of utilities. If by the device of 
a contract for services, American were exacting excessive pay-
) 
) 
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ments that impaired Pacific's capita] and thus weakened its 
ability to serve the public, the commission could disregard the 
separate corporate entities and treat the excessive payments as 
an illegal dividend. (Ohio Oentral Telephone Oorp. v. Public 
Ut-ilittes Oom'n., 127 Ohio St. 556 [189 N.E. 650] ; see, Ballan-
tine on Corporations (Rev. ed.) § 142, p. 330; ct., Western 
Canal Co. v. Railroad Oommission, 216 Cal. 639, 652 [15 P.2d 
853].) We do not have such a case before us, however, for 
the payments under the license contract are not impairing 
Pacific's capita] or affecting its ability to serve the public. 
Moreover, in fixing Pacific's rates the commission may disallow 
expenditures that it finds unreasonable, thus insuring that 
any excessive costs will be met from Pacific's profits. The 
effect of the payments on rates and services is no greater than 
in any other case where the commission and management dis-
agree on the reasonableness of an expenditure, and the man-
agement concludes that it is good business judgment to make I 
such payments from its profits despite the fact that it cannot 
recoup them from its rate payers. 
In developing a nationwide telephone service, American 
has adopted the legally sanctioned practice of conducting 
its'loca} operations through subsidiary operating companies. 
It employs a method it considers reasonable in apportioning 
the costs of the services rendered by it to its subsidiaries among 
them. The contract embodying that method cannot be differ-
entiated from other contracts by which utilities seeure labor, 
materials, and services, except on the theory that the judg-
ment of management is suspect on the reasonableness of ex-
penditures in contracts with affiliated corporations as it is not 
in other contracts. There is no public policy against affiliated 
corporations, however, and the commission can treat them 
differently only to the extent the Legislature so provides or 
to the extent that they are used as a device to defeat the 
exercise of powers the commission has been granted. The Pub-
lic Utilities Act is silent on the question of affiliated corpora-
tions, and only the Legislature can properly decide whether 
they present such dangers of abuse that the commission should 
have broader regulatory powers over them than it now has. 
The order in S.F.17952 and those parts of the order brought 
here for review in S.F. 17953 are annulled. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., 
concurred. 
) 
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SHENK, J .-1 dissent. 
Under the plenary power granted to the Legislature by 
section 22 of Article XII of the Constitution it was certainly 
competent by appropriate legislation to confer upon the 
commission the authority to supervise contractual relationships 
such as existed between the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph 
Company and its owner and corporate master, the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, especially insofar as 
contracts affecting rates are concerned. The Legislature has 
effectively conferred such power on the commission by section 
32 of the Public Utilities Act. By that section the commission 
was expressly authorized to find any existing contract affecting 
rates to be unreasonable. This power could be exercised as to 
expenditures under existing contracts in excess of payments 
properly allowable as part of the rate base. But more perti-
nently, that section also expressly authorized the commission 
to determine the reasonableness of contracts affecting rates 
thereafter to be observed by the utilities under its jurisdiction. 
It is this power that the commission is seeking to exercise 
by the orders under review; and in this respect it is rein-
forced by the general provisions of section 31. 
It may be assumed that the commission would be without 
power to prescribe in advance the terms and conditions of a 
contract and payments thereunder entered into between the 
petitioner and another in the normal course of business in 
which both parties are acting independently and at arm's 
length. But the contract here required to be observed by the 
petitioner is not of that character. The independence of action 
which is essential in the execution of contracts known to the 
law is not present. The real question as I see it is whether 
the commission has exceeded its jurisdiction in making the 
particular orders and not, as petitioner contends, whether 
it was wholly without power to make them. 
The facts do not show the exercise of broader regulatory 
power than the commission possesses. Nor is this a case where 
the petitioner is deprived of the management and control of 
its property. We have here nothing more than a regulation 
guarding against future excessive payments affecting rates 
which could otherwise be imposed upon the petitioner without 
its voluntary bargaining participation. By its order the 
commission is not exceeding its jurisdiction but is merely 
making its jurisdiction effective. In my opinion the particular 
contract here ordered to be observed is just such a contract as 
34 C.Jd-27 
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is contemplated by our law and sound public policy to be ' 
Imbject to supervision by the commission in the manner pro- ,> 
posed. I would affirm the orders. 
CARTER, J.-l dissent. 
The question here presented is not complex. The Pacific 
Telephone and Telegraph Company, an operating communica-
tions utility in California, is completely dominated and con-
trolled by the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 
a New York corporation, whose main function is to hold stock 
in and furnish various services to local telephone operating 
corporations throughout the country, most of which are con· 
trolled by it through stock ownership. American enters into 
purported license fee contracts with its numerous affiliates, 
including Pacific, under which the affiliates pay a percentage 
of their gross revenue for the services to be rendered by 
American. It is conceded that in fixing rates for Pacific, our 
Public Utilities Commission may ignore the percentage basis 
of compensation under those contracts and allow only so much 
as is the reasonable value of such services or the cost thereof 
to American. The sole question is whether the commission 
has authority to approve or disapprove such contracts. I 
believe there can be no doubt of such power. It arises (1) by 
necessary implication, and (2) by the wording of the Public 
Utilities Act. , 
On the first proposition, there are several important con· ~ 
siderations which must be weighed. It has been aptly said: 
"Contracts with operating companies range in subject from 
a single activity to a comprehensive scheme giving virtual 
domination over the policies of the subsidiary utility. But the 
services, even when enumerated at length, are commonly de· 
scribed in such general terIDS that no clear picture of those 
actually rendered can be obtained from examination of the 
contracts ... 
"The profits accruing from the servicing relationship invite 
inquiry into the possibilities of abuse inherent in the holding 
company structure. In the control possessed by the holding 
company, often exercised through common officers or inter· 
locking directorates, lies the power to dictate terms and the 
consequent danger of unreasonable exactions. The modern 
super-holding company system itself furnishes a strong in-
centive for such exactions. Control over operating companies 
through a relatively small investment may be effected by the 
) 
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interposition of subholding units, the financing of which can be 
facilitated by the issuance of bonds and preferred stock . . • 
.. Exploitation of operating companies is detrimental to 
both consumer and investor. Although it is seemingly im-
material to the consumer whether the parent obtains income 
through high service charges or through dividends resulting 
from more economical operations, in fact excessive charges, 
unless disallowed by public utility commissions, may adversely 
affect him. Overpayments for management services result in 
the swelling of operating expenses. When resorted to as a 
screen for profits beyond a fair return, they can prevent a 
rate reduction, or, by so minimizing the return that only small 
profits or none at all are shown, can result in an increase. 
And the sums exacted may be so great as to impair service to 
the public through lack of funds for maintenance or addi-
tions. Furthermore, overcharges for construction or engineer-
ing services, reflected in the operating company's capital 
account, have a dual effect upon rates: they broaden the base 
upon which a fair return must be earned, and enhance costs 
of operations by enlarging the amount annually charged to 
depreciation, thereby increasing the rate required to yield an 
adequate return . . . 
"The disallowance of operating expenses increases the net 
operating revenue for the purposes of determilrlng the fairness 
of the return in a rate case. This increase tends to subject the 
utility to lower rates, with the possible consequence of an 
ultimate decrease in income that may force a comparable re-
duction in expenditures." (49 Harv.L.Rev. 957, 959, 978-981, 
986.) 
It has also been said: "It may be asked why should the 
commission, as representative of the consumers be concerned 
over a 'raid on the treasury of the operating utility.' Directly 
the consumers will not be affected whether the utility is solvent 
or insolvent. Their rates are based upon a fair return on a 
fair value and it should not matter to them who gets it. 
Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the simple facts that 
an insolvent utility has no credit with which to obtain the 
capital necessary for the continuous expansion of service 
demanded from a utility under modern conditions and that 
operation of a utility by receivers seems usually to be thought 
to result in higher operating expenses than would ordinarily 
be incurred. " (Regulation of Utility Contracts,20 St. Louis 
JJ. Rev. 1, 58.) Those considerations point up the vital impor-
I 
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tance of the power of the commission to dlSapprove such 
contracts as a part of rate regulation 4nd of the aecessity 
that the ability of the utility to serve the consumers be not 
impaired. I cannot believe that the Legislature intended to 
leave the commission impotent to cope with those conditions. 
I t may be that some measure of protection is afforded by the 
power to refuse to recognize the license fee contract when 
fixing rates, but having that power, it of necessity follows 
that they may lock the door before the horse is stolen. If they 
may affect the utility management indirectly by subsequent ac-
tion, surely they may take precautionary measures in advance. 
The Alabama Utilities Commission has pertinently observed 
in this connection: "We cannot conceive that it will be 
contended that a Commission is without authority to hnlt a 
raid on the treasury of the operating utility on the plea that 
it has no right in law to manage the property. From our 
point of view, it is not an assertion of management, but rather 
an assertion of reasonable control' over practices which the 
Commission has a right to prevent and should prevent before 
the injury has been done if it is possible for us to arrive there 
in time." (See, Be Southern Bell Tel. ct Tel. 00., P.U.R. 
1932E, 207.) Certainly it was intended that the commission 
would have the power incident, and indeed vital, to protect 
the consumer from improvident waste of funds to the detri-
ment of the service. They surely have the power to accomplish 
directly that which they may do by indirection. While it may 
be that there is no showing in the case at bar that the pay-
ments to American here involved will seriously jeopardize 
Pacific's consumer service capacity, that is not necessary, for ~ 
the situation is so fraught with potential and inherent dangers :',;,",,:. 
that this court should not overrule the commission's judgment : 
that preventive advance action is necessary. It must be' 
remembered that these license fee contracts are not true con-
tracts made at arm's length or on an open market. They are 
between corporations, one of which is controlled by the other. 
As such they are subject to suspicion and theirefore present 
dangerous potentialities. It seems plainly obvious to me that 
if payments' for such services are regularly supervised by the 
commission, it will not only inure to the consumer's benefit, 
but will also put the utility in the advantageous position of 
knowing where it stand!'!, thus escaping the risk of making 
excessive payments which will not be allowed in its rate base. 
That the commission has such implied power is squarely 
declared by the Public Utilities Act. •• The railroad com-
-, 
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mission is hereby vested with power and jurisdiction to super-
vise and regulate every public utility in the state and to do 
all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addi-
tion thereto, which are necessary and convenient in the exer-
cise of such power and jurisdiction." (Public Utilities Act, 
Stats. 1915, p. ll5, § 31; 2 Deering's Cal. Gen. Laws, Act 
6386.) 
Secondly, it is clear that section 32 of the Public Utilities 
Act, quoted in the majority opinion, must be interpreted 88 
empowering the commission to regulate the purported con-
tracts here considered. The literal wording thereof requires it. 
Fear is expressed that if the instant contract is subject to 
approval by the commission, all other contracts or expendi-
tures of a utility may be scrutinized in advance. Whether 
or not that fear is well founded is not necessary to consider. 
I say only that the license fee purported contract between 
the operating utility and its dominating father, Pacific and 
American, may be so treated. There is a clear difference 
between HUch arrangements and others. They are not true 
contracts made at arm's length. They are definitely subject 
to suspicion and potent with possibilities adverse to the inter-
ests of the consumers. 
It must be conceded that the contract here in question W88 
cxecuted by· officials of Pacific who were elected by American 
as the principal stockholder of Pacific and owe their allegiance 
to American. To say that such a contract is beyond the regula-
tory power of the Public Utilities Commission, when it may 
endanger the ability of Pacific to serve its customers, is a step 
backward in the public utility regulation and may open the 
door to abuses seriously detrimental to those dependent upon 
service from public utilities. While I think it is clear that 
the Public Utilities Act expressly empowers the commission 
to regulate such contracts in the public interest, there can be 
no question that it was the intention of the Legislature to 
confer upon the commission all the power necessary to protect 
the public interest. This, the majority overlooks in placing 
8 strict and strained construction upon the provisions of the 
Rct in order to arrive at the conclusion reached. 
I would deny the writs and affirm the orders under review. 
Respondent's and Real Parties in Interest's petitions for 
a rehearing were denied March 27, 1950. Shenk, J., and 
Carter, J., voted for a rehearing. 
